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What do we talk about when we talk about French and Francophone Studies? If we could 
approach French Studies as a Martian anthropologist seeking to understand its rationale but 
ignorant of its history, what might we conclude? As it happens, such disciplinary questions 
engage one of the major concerns at the heart of French philosophy over recent decades: the 
problem of the same and the other. Departing from the orthodox accounts of sameness and 
otherness, the work of polymath and académicien Michel Serres offers us a new approach to 
understanding the relation between identity and alterity, an approach he explores in terms of the 
motif of chirality. Serres not only delivers a radical challenge to one of the most fundamental 
commonplaces of recent French thought, namely the opposition between sameness and alterity, 
but in so doing he also helps us to find new ways of understanding and articulating the nature 
and specificity of French and Francophone Studies today.
Introduction
What do we talk about when we talk about French and Francophone Studies (FFS)? 
If FFS is – as we say these days – a “thing” (and that remains to be established), 
then what sort of thing is it? Much important work has been undertaken in response 
to questions like these in recent years, both in Australia and elsewhere. This work 
has charted the move away from framing French literature as the “third classic” 
alongside Greek and Latin,1 to a rich diversity of methodological approaches and a 
variety of objects of study.2 It has noted the shift from the “Francodoxy” of a Gallic, 
hexagonal paradigm,3 through a period still characterized by the centrality of France 
1 Charles Forsdick, “Mobilising French Studies”, Australian Journal of French Studies, 51: 
2–3 (2014), 250–268 (p. 259).
2 Charles Forsdick, “What’s ‘French’ about French Studies?” Nottingham French Studies, 54: 
3 (2015), 312–327 (p. 312).
3 See François Provenzano, Vies et mort de la Francophonie : une politique française de 
la langue et de la littérature (Brussels and Paris: Les Impressions Nouvelles, 2011), cited in 
Forsdick, “What’s ‘French’ about French Studies?”, p. 320.
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but with an increasing acknowledgment of what are construed as its satellites, 
now designated with the term “pays francophones”, towards a provincializing of 
Metropolitan France, captured in the title of Dominic Thomas’s 2006 book Black 
France.4 In this latter stage of the journey, Metropolitan France sits alongside but 
not in a place of privilege over other French-speaking areas and cultures. Finally, 
there has also been a drive to de-spatialize and de-nominalize FFS, moving away 
from the area studies paradigm to an approach that treats its object adjectivally 
(as “French Studies”, not “France Studies”)5 or even adverbially (engaging with a 
given set of concerns – if the reader will pardon the unwieldy term – “Frenchly”), 
understanding FFS as a collection of modes of engagement with objects of study 
that can be practised by anyone at any time, not necessarily in a geographically or 
linguistically French context. 
So then, what is FFS? Let us start by considering the community of scholars 
working in the field, casting our eye down the list of papers offered at the 2017 
Australian Society for French Studies conference. To give only a brief sample, we 
see titles as methodologically, disciplinarily and linguistically diverse as “Realism, 
Truth and Representation in le jeune cinéma”, “Comment démêler le vrai du faux 
dans les textes dramatiques?”, “The Scandalous Story of Sex work in Cambodia”, 
“Material Culture and Israelite Identity during the French Wars of Religion”, 
“Commentary on the AIDS roman à clef”, “The bagne as lieu de mémoire”, 
“Contesting the Memory of the Algerian War”, “Linguistic Representations 
of ‘Home’ in a French–Kanak Children’s Book”, “L’Imaginaire colonial dans 
les pratiques artistiques en France aujourd’hui” and “Ayant-été et personnage 
romanesque dans l’œuvre de Patrick Modiano”.
What is it, if anything, that makes this Harlequin’s coat of approaches and 
objects of study cohere into the thing we call “French and Francophone Studies”? 
How can it be that the deep and important differences in method, in concerns and 
in vocabulary represented in these papers can all be part of the same conference? 
It is at this point that we come to the wager of this article: what if we could gain 
some purchase on the nature of FFS, or even on the truth of FFS, by considering it 
in terms of – or rather considering it against, and as a challenge to – one of the great 
discussions in recent French thought, perhaps the great discussion of the latter half 
of the twentieth century: that of the same and the other?
4 Dominic Thomas, Black France: Colonialism, Immigration and Transnationalism 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), cited in Jacqueline Dutton, “World Literature in 
French, littérature-monde, and the Translingual Turn”, French Studies, 70: 3 (2016), 404–418 
(p. 407).
5 See Christophe Campos, “The Scope and Methodology of French”, in French in the 90s: 
A Transbinary Conference July 1991, ed. Jennifer Birkett and Michael Kelly (Birmingham: 
Birmingham Modern Languages Publications, 1992), 33–38 (p. 33); cited in Forsdick, “What’s 
‘French’ about French Studies?”, p. 313.
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Sameness, Otherness and French and Francophone Studies
It has pleased more than one historian of recent French philosophy to characterize 
the latter decades of the twentieth century in terms of a preoccupation with alterity 
and difference. Foremost among such histories – it was certainly a well-thumbed 
volume in my own undergraduate library – was Vincent Descombes’ influential 
Le Même et l’autre: quarante-cinq ans de philosophie française (1933–1978).6 
Descombes notes the positive ethical charge accorded to alterity in this period 
by those philosophers who resist any attempt to “traduire l’autre dans la langue 
du même”, that is “[a]pprovisionner l’élément brutal de l’existence, assimiler 
l’hétérogène, donner sens à l’insensé, rationaliser l’incongru”.7 Thinkers such as 
Deleuze, Derrida, Lacan, Irigaray, Kristeva and others seek in one way or another 
to avoid reducing difference to the logic of the same.
This way of thinking valorizes what we might call “otherness-truth”. For this 
way of thinking, truth, insofar as there is such a thing, is always that which is left 
over when everything has been said, that which cannot be directly signified. I know 
of nowhere where this approach to truth is more crisply or lucidly articulated than 
in Julia Kristeva’s rhetorical question in Des Chinoises: “s’il n’y a pas d’‘absolu’, 
qu’est-ce qu’une vérité sinon le non-dit du dit”,8 whether the unspoken is Freudian, 
or the real that escapes the symbolic, or absolute justice or hospitality, if there is 
such a thing. Within this paradigm, truth is whatever remains beyond the grasp of 
our concepts and articulations, other to the reductive grasp of language or other 
categorising systems.
In the early 2000s, however, the tide began to turn against alterity and 
difference in some quarters, and no single volume more succinctly or more 
polemically inveighed against the positive valorization of otherness than Alain 
Badiou’s L’Éthique, undergirded by the much more substantial L’Être et l’événement 
and supplemented latterly by Logiques des mondes.9 Where the philosophers of 
difference see alterity as the key to understanding the nature of truth, Badiou argues 
that the positive valorization of alterity and difference makes truths impossible. 
6 Vincent Descombes, Le Même et l’autre: quarante-cinq ans de philosophie française (1933–
1978) (Paris: Minuit, 1979). Translated as Modern French Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980).
7 Descombes, Le Même et l’autre, p. 129.
8 In context, the claim reads:
Il n’y a pas de temps sans le discours. Donc, il n’y a pas de temps sans le père. Le Père, 
c’est d’ailleurs cela : signe et temps. On comprend alors que ce que le père ne dit pas de 
l’inconscient, ce que le signe et le temps répriment des pulsions, apparait comme leur vérité 
(s’il n’y a pas d’“absolu”, qu’est-ce qu’une vérité sinon le non-dit du dit), et que cette vérité 
ne peut être invaginée que comme une femme. Julia Kristeva, Des Chinoises (Paris: Éditions 
des Femmes, 1974), p. 40.
9 Alain Badiou, L’Ethique: essai sur la conscience du mal (Paris: Hatier, 1998, second edition 
with Caen: Nous, 2003) – references below are to the 2003 edition; L’Étre et l’événement (Paris: 
Seuil, 1958); Logiques des mondes (Paris: Seuil, 2006).
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Badiou’s own position is not that we need less alterity than the philosophers of 
difference would like, but that we already have much, much more than they realize: 
“L’altérité infinie est tout simplement ce qu’il y a”,10 he insists, and “Il y a autant 
de différence entre, disons, un paysan chinois et un jeune cadre norvégien qu’entre 
moi-même et n’importe qui – y compris moi-même. Autant, mais donc aussi ni plus 
ni moins.”11 For Badiou, then, otherness is neither philosophically interesting nor 
ethically privileged. His own proposal is to invert the ethical hierarchy of sameness 
and otherness: “toute la prédication éthique sur l’autre et sa ‘reconnaissance’ doit 
être purement et simplement abandonnée”.12
All the philosophical interest, and indeed the ethical import, for Badiou 
is not on the side of the other but on the side of the same, where the same is 
understood not as what is but as “ce qui advient” in a truth.13 This means that “Il 
n’y a d’éthique que des vérités. Ou plus précisément : il n’y a que l’éthique des 
processus de vérité, du labeur qui fait advenir en ce monde quelques vérités.”14 In 
stark contrast to the otherness-truth sketched above, Badiou’s ethics of truths is 
“indifférente aux différences”:15 truth is what is held in common by those who are 
held by it, the universal ideal of a popular revolutionary movement or of an artistic 
style. So, as Badiou memorably notes, the truth has no dreadlocks.16 As opposed to 
the otherness-truth of the Tel Quel thinkers, we can characterize Badiou’s approach 
as a plea for sameness-truth: truth as that which is constant across differences, and 
which renders them irrelevant.
So today we are faced, it would appear, with two implacably opposed 
philosophies, attendant ethics, and notions of truth. On the one hand we have the 
various philosophers of difference – Deleuze, Kristeva, Derrida, Nancy, Levinas 
and others – who, each in their own way, find truth in alterity, positively code that 
alterity and give it a prominent place in their ethical thought. And on the other hand 
there is Badiou’s philosophy of the same, for which it is sameness, not alterity, that 
is associated with truths and that carries a positive ethical charge. 
It is not my purpose here to arbitrate between these two positions. Indeed, I 
intend to argue that to seek to do so would risk missing something very significant 
that they share, something even more important than their differences. What 
Badiou and his antagonists have in common is the assumption that the division 
between sameness and otherness can be made to hold in the first place, and that the 
two terms can unproblematically receive contrasting ethical valorisations. In fact, 
10 Badiou, L’Ethique, p. 43, AB’s emphasis.
11 Badiou, L’Éthique, p. 44, AB’s emphasis.
12 Badiou, L’Éthique, p. 43.
13 Badiou, L’Éthique, p. 46.
14 Badiou, L’Éthique, p. 47.
15 Badiou, L’Éthique, p. 46.
16 Alain Badiou, “Behind the Sacred Law, There is Fear”, IslamOnline.net, 3 March 2004. 
Available at http://www.lacan.com/islbad.htm. Accessed August 2017.
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there is a series of striking similarities between otherness-truth and sameness-truth. 
Badiou’s own valorisation of sameness over a ubiquitous and uninteresting infinite 
difference does not in fact challenge the dichotomy of sameness and alterity upon 
which the philosophies of otherness rely. For Badiou, otherness is banal, trivial 
and “tout simplement ce qu’il y a”,17 in the same way that, for the philosophers of 
alterity, the reduction of the other to the same in Aristotelian logic, in language and 
in politics is ubiquitous and simply “what there is”. 
Badiou and his adversaries also share a concept of absolute or infinite 
alterity, a radical otherness expressed famously by Derrida in the phrase “tout autre 
est tout autre”: every other is wholly other.18 Once again, the two positions have in 
common the assumption that either sameness or otherness (but not both) can carry 
a preeminent positive ethical value. Finally, just as the philosophers of otherness 
claim that alterity is only ever a heartbeat or an ill-advised stroke of the pen away 
from being reduced to the same, for Badiou truths require their subject to maintain 
a vigilant, ongoing fidelity if they are not to be dissolved into the endless circulation 
of differing opinions. So Badiou’s disagreement with otherness-truth only makes 
sense in the context of the ample common ground he shares with it.
Furthermore – and with this we circle back to this article’s opening concerns 
– neither otherness-truth nor sameness-truth are supple enough to engage with 
some thing as complex as FFS. The two speed gearbox of sameness and otherness 
does not wield enough nuance to do justice to this diverse and complex area. FFS 
scholars are not the same as each other, but neither are we wholly other either. We 
do not all deal in the same truths: what we call truth in linguistics, for example, 
is not the same as what we call truth in politics, or literature, or film studies, or 
history. And yet the truths that circulate in and sometimes across our various 
methodologies are not absolutely other to each other either; they can be connected 
in sometimes very complex and painstaking ways. So how might we think about 
FFS, or about anything else for that matter, in a way that reduces neither to 
otherness-truth nor to sameness-truth?
Michel Serres: chiral truth
In order to break the impasse of sameness-truth and otherness-truth, let us turn 
to the work of Michel Serres. Serres – as many in the Australian FFS community 
will know from his fondly remembered visit down under in July and August 1998, 
as well as from his inimitable writing itself – is a thinker of incredible novelty 
and fecundity, striking a genuinely distinctive philosophical melody amid a 
contemporary cacophony of minor variations on a small number of philosophical 
themes. Serres was writing against the linguistic turn at the height of the linguistic 
17 Badiou, L’Éthique, p. 43.
18 See, for example, Jacques Derrida, Donner la mort (Paris: Galilée, 1999), p. 110.
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turn,19 and he pre-empted by decades some of the most important current 
international trends, notably eco-philosophy, object oriented thought and the new 
materialisms,20 though, for reasons I have reflected on elsewhere,21 he has never 
received the same attention as other philosophers of his generation such as Derrida, 
Deleuze and Foucault. 
Born in 1930 in Agen, in the rural Aquitaine area of south-west France, 
Serres passed through the École Navale in 1949 but resigned from the navy for 
reasons of conscience and in 1950 entered the École Normale Supérieure, rue 
d’Ulm. He was classmates with Jacques Derrida, with whom he went on a skiing 
holiday in 1953, where Derrida met his future wife Marguerite. At the ENS 
Serres studied mathematics, writing his major thesis on Leibniz. From 1958 to 
1968 he lectured at Clermont-Ferrand where he was a friend and colleague of 
Foucault at the time the latter was working on Les Mots et les choses. In 1967 
he participated alongside Alain Badiou in a three-part television series entitled 
“Modèle et structure”,22 and in 1968–9 he took up a teaching post at the newly 
founded experimental university in Vincennes, where he was succeeded by 
Gilles Deleuze, later remarking in an interview that he counted Deleuze as his 
best friend.23 He is the author of over fifty books to date, including two best-
sellers (on the technology of millennials and on the financial crisis of 2008)24 
and has his own weekly radio show on Radio France’s France Info station: 
“Le sens de l’info”, which appeared weekly from 2002 to 2018. In 1990 he was 
elected to the Académie française, fauteuil d’Edgar Faure (18e fauteuil), and he 
was the first académicien who, true to his pacifist convictions, refused to wear 
the ceremonial sword. Now in his eighty-ninth year, he is still writing today, 
reliably publishing one to two books a year. So Serres is himself both cut from a 
quintessentially traditional cloth – ENS, Académie française – and also marginal 
in his generation, both geographically, for he has always retained an affection for 
the Garonne region, never succumbing to the common fetishism of Paris, and also 
intellectually, writing in ways orthogonal to the intellectual breaking waves of the 
1960s–1990s.
The reason why I turn to Michel Serres in this argument is that he offers us a 
19 See Michel Serres, Les cinq sens (Paris: Grasset, 1985).
20 For a more detailed analysis of Serres’s prescient contributions to these debates, see my 
forthcoming Michel Serres: Figures of Thought (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019).
21 See my paper Michel Serres Today, available at https://monash.academia.edu/
ChristopherWatkin.
22 Alain Badiou, Michel Serres and Jean Fléchet, Modèle et structure : Michel Serres et Alain 
Badiou s’entretiennent (IPN : 1978). Transcript available at http://www.cndp.fr/media-sceren/
DocumentsAccompagnement/modele_et_structure.pdf.
23 See the transcript of an interview with Hari Kunzru, 10 January 1995, available at http://
www.harikunzru.com/michel-serres-interview-1995/.
24 Michel Serres, Petite Poucette (Paris: Éditions le Pommier, 2012); Temps des Crises (Paris: 
Éditions le Pommier, 2009).
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strikingly different way of thinking about sameness and alterity, a way that is more 
amenable to understanding and being able to articulate the complex identity of 
something like FFS. He resists both the sameness and otherness paradigms, which 
he would consider equally reductive: it is not the case that every other is wholly 
other, nor that a universal truth makes differences irrelevant. In a Leibnizian spirit 
he insists that everything is related, though not straightforwardly so, elaborating 
an account of truth that privileges neither alterity nor identity but thinks rather in 
terms of chirality, the property of two objects which have reflective symmetry but 
which cannot be superimposed one on top of the other, such as almost all amino 
acids and our left and right hands. 
Two chiral structures are at the same time quite opposite and quite identical25 
such that, as Serres puts it, the “same” and “other” have become twins.26 The logic 
of antithesis and the lexicon of identity and difference are wholly inadequate to 
describe this relation neither of simple identity nor of straightforward alterity, a 
relation which Serres dubs a “symétrie non-symétrique”27 and “l’altérité la plus 
raffinée”.28 Chirality resolves neither, in the final analysis, to simple identity nor 
to radical alterity, nor again to any simple mixture of the two. In fact, it precedes 
the dichotomy between identity and alterity. Take the example of handedness. A 
left-hander himself, Serres insists that sinistrality is not the opposite of dextrality, 
nor its “other”, and still less is it the “same” as right-handedness, as if it were 
interchangeable with it as its equal. The left-hander is opposed to the right-hander 
while in a way remaining identical with them,29 and this complex relation confounds 
the unsophisticated categories of “same” and “other”, just as it confounds the 
superposition of one hand exactly upon the other. The left-handed person cannot 
be thought of as the equal and opposite of the right-hander. Forced to adapt to a 
world of objects designed around the right-handed user, the left-hander develops 
capacities and makes adjustments of which the right-hander knows nothing.
This does not mean, however, that the left-hander is simply ambidextrous or 
that she represents some Hegelian sublation of sinistrality and dextrality:
Le gaucher dit contrarié devient-il ambidextre ? Non, plutôt un corps croisé, 
comme une chimère : resté gaucher pour le ciseau, le marteau, la faux, le 
fleuret, le ballon, la raquette, pour le geste expressif sinon pour la société 
– ici, le corps – , il n’a jamais cessé d’appartenir à la minorité maladroite, 
sinistre, prétend le latin – vive la langue grecque qui la dit aristocrate ! Mais 
droitier pour la plume et pour la fourchette, il serre la bonne main après la 
25 Serres, L’Hermaphrodite : Sarrasine sculpteur (Paris: Flammarion, 1987), p. 74.
26 Serres, L’Hermaphrodite, p. 71.
27 Serres, L’Hermaphrodite, p. 70.
28 Serres, L’Hermaphrodite, p. 70. Serres makes a similar argument about bilingualism in Le 
Tiers-Instruit (Paris: Éditions François Bourin), p. 6. 
29 Serres, L’Hermaphrodite, p. 74.
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présentation – voici l’âme – ; bien élevé pour la vie publique, mais gaucher 
pour la caresse et dans la vie privée. A ces organismes complets les mains 
pleines.30
There remains an unrecuperated remainder in the left-hander’s awkwardness 
and elaborate behavioural compensations, and yet Serres can also insist that 
only the thwarted left-hander makes for fulfilment and unity because only they 
are forced outside of their corporeal comfort zone to relativize their own position 
and experience a world they know was not made for them, and of which their 
experience is one possibility among others. Perfect ambidextrality, in fact, would 
fail to yield this sort of fulfilment that comes from being able to see beyond one’s 
own habits and preferences.
It is illuminating to reflect upon this complex account of sinistrality in relation 
to the experience of moving out of one’s own comfort zone to learn a second or 
third foreign language and culture. In Mary Louise Pratt’s influential formulation, 
learning a modern foreign language is about “knowing languages and knowing the 
world through languages”.31 One of the implications of this richly dense formula 
is that learning a second or third language and culture is unique among university 
subjects. It cannot be reduced to a “what”, to a body of knowledge or set of 
processes, insights, facts, skills or codes. A language and culture are not a “what”, 
an object of study, but “how” we access any object of study whatsoever. Languages 
aside, as a general rule whatever subject I study at an Anglophone university I 
study in English, even if within that subject I am required to learn another natural 
or artificial language. In other words, my fundamental mode of accessing the world 
is not challenged and put into question in the learning of those subjects in the way it 
is when I learn a modern foreign language in the target language. In the latter case, 
my way of engaging with the world itself is at stake and I am challenged – though 
of course it is a challenge I can refuse – to bring more of myself to my studies, to 
open more of myself to questioning, to become more aware of the modalities and 
contingencies of the way I understand myself and the way I relate to the world 
around me, and to do so at a more intimate level than if the primacy of my first 
language remains unchallenged.
These concerns of learning – and learning in – a second or third language 
are very keenly felt by Serres himself, as he attests in “My Mother Tongue, My 
Paternal Languages”, originally given as an address at the conference “Lost Empire: 
France and Its Other Worlds”, held at Stanford University in April 2006.32 In this 
30 Serres, Le Tiers-Instruit, pp. 35–36.
31 Mary Louise Pratt, “Building a new public idea about language”, Profession (2003), 110–
119 (p. 112).
32 Michel Serres, “Conclusion: My Mother Tongue, My Paternal Languages”, in Elisabeth 
Mudimbye-Boyi (ed.), Empire Lost: France and its Other Worlds (New York: Lexington Books, 
2009), 197–206. I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to 
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address he explains that his mother tongue is not French at all but the “Occitan, 
Gascon”33 spoken in the family home during his childhood in Agen. Serres’s youth 
and education were dogged by linguistic prejudice. He was mocked at the naval 
academy for the way in which he pronounced the end of the words “trente” and 
“quarante” in a hearing test;34 though he graduated 2e ex aequo in his cohort for the 
agrégation de philosophie in 1955, he was not put forward for a teaching post in 
much of France on account of the difficulty the students would be assumed to have 
in understanding him,35 and he witnesses to his frustration at trying to make himself 
understood when asking for “un aller-retour Bois-Colombes” at a Parisian train 
station.36 This is what we might call Serres’s linguistic sinistrality, which gives 
rise to his feeling of being an “interior Francophone”37 who spoke (and would still 
speak, could anyone understand him) a “gascon francophonie”,38 the linguistic 
equivalent of the thwarted left-hander’s accommodation to the dominant chirality.
Serres is acutely aware of the asymmetry and power dynamics at play even 
in the study and “protection” of “endangered” languages, and he impishly describes 
how
[o]n the day that the university set aside funds for the participant-observer 
study of my ruined Occitan culture, I began to dream, with some vengefulness, 
I admit, of gathering a team of Pyrenean shepherds who would take the train 
for Paris and study the customs of the professors of the Collège de France, 
their cuisine (raw or cooked?), and their sexual habits.39
He is also painfully aware of the prejudices of institutions charged with the 
preservation and development of language. How can it be, for example, that the 
word “adischats”, spoken by six million French people as a way of taking leave 
of each other, finds no place in the Dictionnaire Robert and is considered among 
“provincial regionalisms, archaic and obsolete”,40 while faux Anglicisms such as 
“winglet” easily find their place there? The increasing insinuation of English into 
the Robert is for Serres a move in which we see the biter bit, where even the French 
language, dominant in relation to regional dialects and accents, is under threat 
now from “the one exclusive communicative idiom” of English.41 The national 
company which forced the closure of the local firm is now under threat from the 
multi-national corporation.
this address.
33 Serres, “Conclusion: My Mother Tongue”, p. 197.
34 Serres, “Conclusion: My Mother Tongue”, p. 199.
35 Serres, “Conclusion: My Mother Tongue”, p. 199.
36 Serres, “Conclusion: My Mother Tongue”, p. 200.
37 Serres, “Conclusion: My Mother Tongue”, p. 202.
38 Serres, “Conclusion: My Mother Tongue”, p. 206.
39 Serres, “Conclusion: My Mother Tongue”, p. 201.
40 Serres, “Conclusion: My Mother Tongue”, p. 203.
41 Serres, “Conclusion: My Mother Tongue”, p. 204.
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Serres, then, is closer to the community of learners of French as a 
foreign language than we might otherwise think, and in particular he is close to 
those with experience of being a linguistic minority within a dominant system, 
whether regional languages in France, Creole speakers in France’s DOM-TOM, 
First Nations’ languages in Canada, Aboriginal languages in Australia, or indeed 
the experience of students, both domestic and international, in an Anglophone 
university context, whose first language is not English. The experience of these and 
other groups of being forced to learn a dominant language parallels Serres’s own 
linguistic sinistrality.
So as we colleagues teaching in FFS departments coax, encourage and 
perhaps from time to time even force our students to inhabit a language and culture 
that sit sometimes slightly and sometimes radically askance their comfortable 
patterns of thought and expression, what we are doing is drawing them into a 
linguistico-cultural sinistrality which is, globally speaking, a majority experience 
of multilingualism. We invite them to take what, for now, is the hard way round for 
them, to accommodate to a world that – as some of them may perhaps be discovering 
for the first time – is not made for them. It is an experience of decentring and a 
relativizing of one’s own way of being in the world that the left-hander knows all 
too well.
Similarly, in our own work within the field of FFS we are rarely dealing with 
customary approaches to our objects of study. In my own research, for an academy 
that still all too often equates Anglophone philosophy with philosophy tout court, 
and still sometimes harbours ideas of French language philosophy that, in other 
non-philosophical contexts, would attract accusations of xenophobia, it is hard not 
to be aware of one’s disciplinary left-handedness. Furthermore, for FFS as for the 
left-handed person, sinistrality is not the equal and opposite of dextrality. To inhabit 
and know the world through a second language is not to be monolingual twice, but 
neither is it radically other to a monolingual mindset. As we FFS scholars know, it 
can change and relativize one’s understanding of one’s first language and culture 
so that, in the words of T.S. Eliot’s “Little Gidding”, “the end of all our exploring” 
may well “be to arrive where we started | And know the place for the first time”.42
French and Francophone Studies, pantasms, and North-West passages
Learning a second language and culture (as opposed to being raised bilingually, 
which brings its own, different dynamics and challenges) makes left-handers of 
us and of our students, and does so in a way that can resolve neither to sameness 
nor otherness. But what about our various disciplinary approaches, methods and 
objects of study? How can Serres help us to think how these all cohere into the field 
we call “French and Francophone Studies”? Serres’s own example is impressive: 
42 T. S. Eliot, “Little Gidding”, Four Quartets (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 
1971), 239–242.
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with licence degrees in mathematics, letters and philosophy from the ENS and an 
agrégation in philosophy, his own qualifications are genuinely cross-disciplinary. 
His writing draws knowledgeably on areas as varied as information theory, fluid 
dynamics, Archimedean and set theoretical mathematics, Platonic dialogue, 
ecology and topology, and on figures as diverse as Leibniz, Foucault, Comte, Zola, 
Turner, Balzac, La Fontaine, Lucretius and Molière.
The reader of Michel Serres’s writing is struck by how he has developed 
an idiom that can move – to take one example – from animal behaviour through 
ancient history to philosophy of language in a matter of paragraphs.43 As he forges 
connections between such areas, he is scrupulous to avoid any master discourse. 
There is no one discipline or one vocabulary to rule them all, no one mode of 
expression that plays the role of a degree-zero discourse, through which all other 
disciplinary approaches are to be viewed and against which they are to be judged:
Non, je ne projette pas une langue sur l’autre, une physique sur l’histoire, 
une science exacte sur une science humaine, je tente seulement de parler 
à plusieurs voix. Je tente de penser la multiplicité dans sa différence et ses 
fluctuations. Je suis perdu, sans lieu, au beau milieu du passage du Nord-
Ouest, dans un état intermédiaire entre les sciences, dans la distribution 
fractale et multiple, de terres, d’eau, de glace éparse, de banquise.44
I propose to call what Serres is trying to avoid here a “pantasm”, from the Greek 
panta: “all things” or “everything”.45 It is a pantasm, for example, to claim that 
“everything is fundamentally economic and, in the final analysis, can be adequately 
explained only in economic terms”, or “everything is fundamentally psychoanalytic 
and can be adequately explained, in the final analysis, only in psychoanalytic 
terms”, and so on. It is the dominance of one discipline or approach over all the 
others, acting as a yardstick and the final court of arbitration for all other discourses. 
If “to the person with a hammer, everything is a nail”, then to a literary pantasm, 
everything is a text, and to an economic pantasm, the base is always economic and 
the superstructure always derives from it.
How does FFS sit in relation to pantasms and Serres’s resistance to them? 
The first thing to note is that FFS itself is not a pantasm. FFS does not claim that 
“everything is” anything. And yet, it still manages to travel between disparate 
disciplines, methodologies and approaches. It does so not in an imperial, totalizing 
and reductive way, but in terms of speaking in what Serres calls “multiple voices”.
Pantasms perform a Platonic gesture. They insist that the truth or essence of 
a thing is not evident in the thing itself but must be sought in some discourse that 
43 This example is taken from the opening paragraphs of Rome : Le livre des fondations (Paris: 
Hachette, 1983).
44 Serres, Rome, p. 309. 
45 See my discussion of the pantasm at https://christopherwatkin.com/2013/10/07/the-
pantasm-heraclitus-michel-serres-and-the-changeux-ricoeur-exchange-on-naming-the-human/.
136  Christopher Watkin
comes to dominate it: something may look like a war, but it was really all about 
stimulating the economy; it may look like a novel, but we can only unlock its true 
meaning if we turn to cognitive science. When sameness and otherness philosophies 
think the relation between the singular and the universal, they tend to retain the 
Platonic structure of the Form and the particular, a structure according to which the 
universal is an idea in which the singular participates. For Serres, this approach can 
only ever conceive the global or the universal as what he calls an “inflated local”,46 
and such an approach always struggles to grasp the universal. For Serres himself, 
by contrast, the path from the local to the global knows of no qualitative leap: the 
global is not a pantasm but a network of localities, not something under which the 
local can be subsumed or into which it can be incorporated. The global is arrived at 
incrementally, asymptotically, and not in a Platonic leap.
The principle that characterizes Serres’s position at this point, and that 
distinguishes it both from otherness and sameness philosophies, is summed 
up in a phrase he quotes repeatedly, beginning with his 1968 thesis on Leibniz 
and continuing in his most recent writings. The quotation comes from a point in 
Leibniz’s Philosophische Schriften where he in turn quotes Nolant de Fatouville’s 
Commedia dell’Arte play Arlequin, Empereur dans la lune (1693).47 Given the 
recurrent appearances of this quotation throughout the more than five decades of 
Serres’s work, it is as close as we will come to a brief summary of his own complex 
thought. 
Upon returning from his journey to the moon, the multi-colored Harlequin 
addresses a learned assembly eager to hear news of the strange world he has 
encountered, but the report they receive comes as a great disappointment. Harlequin 
tells his nonplussed audience of the lunar world he has visited, “c’est partout et 
toujours comme chez nous, aux degrés de grandeur et de perfection près”.48 What a 
disappointment to the gathered scholars, itching as they were to hear of the exotic, 
the unheard-of, the Other. To say that even the most glamorously distant location is 
“partout et toujours comme chez nous” is to claim that all alterity is also sameness.
Harlequin is then forced by his disgruntled audience to divest himself of his 
coat, eventually stripping down to his naked and tattooed body. As the audience 
make to leave, however, they turn back in amazement and, looking at the spot 
where Harlequin had been standing a moment before, exclaim “Pierrot! Pierrot! 
[…] Pierrot Lunaire!”49 Blank, all-white Pierrot now stands in the place of the 
46 Michel Serres, Les cinq sens (Paris: Grasset, 1985), pp. 338–339.
47 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Lezbniz, ed. C. I. 
Gerhardt, 7 vols (Berlin, 1875–1880), VI, p. 548.
48 Michel Serres, Le Système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2006), p. 1. The moment is also referenced in La Traduction : Hermès 
III (Paris: Minuit, 1974), pp. 132, 143; Le Tiers-Instruit, p. 227, Le Gaucher Boiteux : puissance 
de la pensée (Paris: Éditions le Pommier, 2015), p. 57; Rome, p. 199.
49 Serres, Le Tiers-Instruit, p. 17.
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multi-colored, determinate, local Harlequin. Serres’s point is a chromatic one: 
blank, universal whiteness is not composed of an absence of colour but of all colors; 
the universal and global are arrived at not by jumping out of the local in a puff of 
abstraction, but by multiplying local instances and seeking carefully to relate them 
to each other. They are not related, however, in any straightforward way, but by 
what Serres calls North-West passages, named after the winding and treacherous 
sea route from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans between Greenland and Canada. It 
is a real connection, but it is not a straightforwardly linear one.
It is in terms of this local, painstaking navigation that Serres works through 
what it means to engage in cross-disciplinary study. Traversing the borders between 
academic disciplines cannot be done in a simple, off-the-shelf manner, but must 
proceed through a careful, labyrinthine navigation of the complex and unique 
relations between different fields. It takes time, flexibility and sensitivity. Finding 
a way through the North-West passage is not general and systematic but each time 
bespoke, not accomplished in a puff of abstraction but by establishing a careful 
series of local connections:
[L]e passage est rare et resserre […] Des sciences humaines aux sciences 
exactes, ou inversement, le chemin ne traverse pas un espace homogène et 
vide. La métaphore de cet archipel extraordinairement compliqué du Grand 
Nord canadien, encombré le plus souvent de glaces, est exacte. Le plus 
souvent, le passage est fermé, soit par terres, soit par glaces, soit aussi parce 
qu’on se perd. Et si le passage est ouvert, c’est le long d’un chemin difficile 
à prévoir. Et singulier, le plus souvent.50
Serres characterizes his own work with the image of an eighteenth century salon, 
bringing the disciplines together, not like a modern university, dividing them and 
often making them compete with each other.51 It does not seek a system but a 
synthesis.52
50 Michel Serres, Hermès V : Le Passage du Nord-Ouest (Paris: Minuit, 1980), p. 18.
51 Raoul Mortley (ed.), French Philosophers in Conversation: Levinas, Schneider, Serres, 
Irigaray, Le Doeuff, Derrida (London: Routledge, 1991). Electronic version available at https://
www.epublications.bond.edu.au/french_philosophers/4. 
52 Perhaps surprisingly for scholars of modern French thought familiar with the work of 
Deleuze and Derrida, Serres does not shy away from the term “synthesis” to describe the goal of 
philosophy (Mortley [ed.], French Philosophers in Conversation, p. 53), of his own “procedural” 
style of thought (Éloge de la philosophie en langue française [Paris: Fayard, 1995], p. 239), 
or of the characters he invents throughout his work (Le Gaucher boiteux, p. 116). He insists 
that, although the relations he traces do not form a systematic or methodological unity, they 
do form a synthesis (Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, Éclaircissements. Cinq entretiens avec 
Bruno Latour [Paris: Éditions François Bourin, 1992], p. 150). In short, for Serres “[i]l ne vaut 
pas la peine d’entrer, jeune, en philosophie, si on n’a pas l’espoir, le projet ou le rêve, de tenter 
un jour la synthèse” (Hermès V : Le Passage du Nord-Ouest, p. 24). For Serres, as opposed for 
example to the Deleuze and Guattari of Mille plateaux, “system” is the term identified with 
rigidity and closure, and “synthesis” describes dynamic networks of isomorphic relations open 
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How might all this help us think about French and Francophone Studies? 
From the point of view of our institutional silos, FFS is rarely adequately understood, 
and can all too easily be superficially construed as divided and eclectic, as if cross-
disciplinarity were somehow a weakness. But Serres helps us understand that this 
is a naïve view, a view that refuses to take into account how cross-disciplinary 
approaches are necessary to respond to many of our most pressing current problems. 
Serres and Bruno Latour after him have insisted on the fact that the challenges we 
face today, such as climate change, social cohesion and inequality, are complex and 
cross many disciplinary approaches, and that the best – indeed the only effective – 
responses to those questions are similarly multi-disciplinary:
La sagesse donne l’aune de mesure. La crainte de la solution unitaire fait le 
commencement de la sagesse. Aucune solution ne constitue la seule solution 
: ni telle religion, ni telle politique, ni telle science. Le seul espoir reste que 
cette dernière puisse apprendre une sagesse tolérante que les autres instances 
n’ont jamais su vraiment apprendre et nous évite un monde uni, follement 
logique, rationnellement tragique.53
What great news this is for FFS scholars: we have no need to go outside the bounds 
of this rich tapestry of approaches characterized as “French and Francophone 
Studies” in order to be thoroughly immersed in a multi-disciplinary community of 
researchers who are nevertheless held together by an ever-changing set of North-
West passages that never cohere into a master discourse. If monolingualism is the 
illiteracy of the twenty-first century, then mono-disciplinarity is its parochialism.
Serres’s appeal to the salon as a metaphor of his own work draws our 
attention to one further aspect of this cross-disciplinary enterprise he describes: 
there is something characteristically French about it. While by no means exclusively 
French, the phenomenon of the literary or cultural salon has a fine French heritage 
from the eighteenth century onwards. In addition, France has more than its share 
of cross-disciplinary authors. We might think of Zola, of Pascal, of Comte, or of 
Jules Verne, to all of whom Serres has devoted extended studies, or of Diderot 
or Montaigne, whom he also discusses. Serres designates such authors as those 
who write with two hands, writers of texts that transgress customary disciplinary 
boundaries. They are writers of “textes mélangés”, authors like Montaigne who is 
“plus profond qu’il ne le laisse accroire ou que nous l’avons laissé dire et ouï dire”, 
precisely because of his ability to move effortlessly from one domain to another, 
from the local to the global, from the frivolous to the profound and back again.54
to transformation, reconfiguration and expansion.
53 Serres, Le Tiers-instruit, p. 188.
54 Michel Serres, Genèse (Paris: Grasset, 1982), p. 61. 
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Conclusion
If, then, we could approach FFS as a Martian anthropologist, insouciant of its 
genesis, simply seeking to understand what the term designates, what might we 
conclude? One of our first observations, I think, would be that, in contrast to most 
non-language academic areas of study, FFS is owned by no dominant methodology, 
vocabulary, personality or object. And that is both precious, and rare. What this 
means for FFS scholars is that we are all, to some extent, exiles and guests in FFS. 
We are all immigrants here: immigrants from linguistics, from philosophy, from 
literary studies and elsewhere… this is a glorious exilic community bubbling over 
with cross-disciplinary ferment and speaking multiple voices. We sit askance and 
athwart the academic disciplinary silos; we trouble the neat compartments and the 
hegemonic discourses of our universities. 
And what of FFS itself? It is emphatically not a pantasm, trying desperately 
to find the Platonic essence of Frenchness in its various objects of study. Serres 
would encourage us, in fact, not to see it as a series of objects of study at all, but as 
a network of North-West passages between different matters of concern. As such, it 
is a verbal rather than a nominal discipline, not an object but a way of relating. This 
is important, I think, because it means that we FFS scholars do not need to justify 
the coherence of our discipline in terms of defining what “Frenchness” is or – even 
worse – what it ought to be. What if someone were to ask: “what is particularly 
French about this set of relations you say characterizes FFS?” The answer is simple: 
the set of relations itself is what is particular to FFS. There is no meta-discourse to 
reconcile the rich proliferation of North-West passages in an over-arching concept, 
just as there is no single discourse or approach that can do justice to the French and 
Francophone world. There is no Platonic essence that transcends the relations that 
comprise FFS. There is no static idea of Frenchness that includes one relation and 
excludes others.
Does this mean that anything at all can be included in FFS? Not at all, just as 
the North-West passage cannot be imagined to connect any place whatsoever with 
any other, or take any old route to get there. There are many ways of tracing North-
West passages: migration of people, of ideas, of language, economic relations, 
cultural relations, linguistic relations and others, but these routes are by no means 
arbitrary.
Serres issues a series of particularly pertinent invitations and challenges to 
a FFS community in an English-dominant country. He challenges us to understand 
FFS neither as a self-identical whole according to the paradigm of sameness-truth, 
nor as a dislocated collocation of singular alterities following the paradigm of 
otherness-truth, but as a set of bespoke relationships composing an ever-shifting 
de-centred cross-disciplinary conversation. Serres invites us to embrace and 
exploit our sinistrality, to recognize the benefit, both for ourselves and our students, 
of being linguistically, culturally and methodologically adaptive and, at least at 
first, constructively maladroit. He invites us to find the most unlikely North-West 
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passages between our various concerns and projects of research, to cross our 
disciplinary boundaries and reach beyond our scholarly comfort zones. It is a rare 
privilege afforded by a field of research such as ours to take advantage of its cross-
disciplinary nature and be disciplinarily adventurous, engaging with concerns and 
approaches outside our own immediate projects and striking up conversations 
with those who work in disciplines other than our own. Finally, Serres would 
invite us, I think, as we journey beyond our disciplinary comfort zones, and as 
we search out those winding North-West passages, to seek ways to bring those 
new complementarities to bear on the pressing contemporary problems that can 
only adequately be addressed in such a multidisciplinary way. FFS is irreducibly, 
stubbornly, implacably, gloriously cross-disciplinary: a microcosm not, sadly, of 
what the university is, but of what the university could, and perhaps should, be.
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